January 28, 2012
John Cage and the Silence of Zen

Mabel Nash-Greenberg

Essay for Religious Experience & Literary Form with Alan Hodder

12.08.11

 

John Cage and the Silence of Zen

 

John Cage, (1912-1992) was an American artist, philosopher and music theorist. He was one of the leading figures of the post-war avant-garde and is regarded widely as one of the most important composers of the 20th Century. Cage was deeply inspired by Zen Buddhism and other Eastern modes of thought and philosophy, inspirations which reflected in his creative works. In 1952, Cage composed what would be viewed by many, later, as the pinnacle of his musical career: 4’33’’. 4’33’’ was a piece consisting of three movements, and not a single musical note, lasting four minutes and thirty-three seconds.  4’33’’ may be John Cage’s most widely-known, and most controversial piece. By drawing into question the nature of music and performance, as well as the relationship between performer and audience, he not only lost a handful of friends; Cage introduced to the Western art world an entirely new mode of interpreting art that was influenced greatly by his fascination with Zen Buddhism and its treatment of silence.

Any attempt at realizing the “Truth of Zen” by way of discursive thought and language is a nonsensical one, a road to a dead end. This must be said before any attempt can be made to do so:

The idea that the ultimate truth of life and of things generally is to be intuitively and not conceptually grasped, and this intuitive prehension is the foundation not only of philosophy but of all other cultural activities, is what the Zen form of Buddhism has contributed to the cultivation of artistic appreciation among the Japanese people… It is here then that the spiritual relationship between Zen and the Japanese conception of art is established. (Suzuki, Zen and Japanese Culture, 219-220)

Despite the inability of language to convey tathata, Zen texts still utilize form, language and art, but in a far different manner than most religious scriptures. Zen is anti-dogmatic and anti-scriptural; emphasizing instead the importance of experiential wisdom, the direct realization of spiritual truths through intuition rather than intellect. Belief in the non-reality of a pervading Self is ubiquitous in most (if not all) Zen Buddhist texts. How then, is it possible that an artist may be both them-Self, a distinguished creator of artistic works, and Zen? How has John Cage incorporated Zen Buddhism into his creative works? Is the concept of a “Zen artist” not inherently problematic? 

Zen is a product of the meeting of Chinese and Indian thought. Though many legends focus on The Buddha as the primary figure of Enlightenment, Zen incorporated much from Taoism in terms of metaphysics. Technically a school of Mahayana Buddhism, Zen is believed to have been born when Indian monk Bodhidharma (470-543 CE) taught at the Shaolin Monastery of China. 

Zen differs from other forms of Mahayana Buddhism in its characteristic method of realizing its philosophy. It emphasizes experiential wisdom as the path to enlightenment. This method is known as za-zen, meaning “practice enlightenment.” In Zen, meditation-practice (za-zen) is itself considered Enlightenment, not a means of achieving It. D.T. Suzuki (who is often credited with bringing Zen to the West in the late 1940s) wrote that “one should free oneself of the idea that practice and enlightenment are not one in the same.” According to Suzuki, the method of transmission of Zen consists in seeing directly into the mystery of our own being, which, according to Zen, is Reality itself: 

Zen advises us not to follow the verbal or written teachings of the Buddha, not to believe in a higher being other than oneself, not to practice formulas of ascetic training but to gain an inner experience which is to take place in the deepest recesses of one’s being. This is an appeal to an intuitive mode of understanding which consists in experiencing what is known in Japanese as Satori (wu in Chinese). Without Satori, there is no Zen. Zen and satori are synonymous. The importance of this satori experience has thus now come to be regarded as something exclusively related to Zen. (Suzuki, Zen and Japanese Culture, from “Zen and Haiku,” 218)

This Satori experience is an intuitive grasp of reality, beyond the forms it takes, and is reminiscent of William James’ qualities of a mystical experience. Suzuki lays out the characteristics of a Satori experience: “That there is noetic quality in mystic experiences has been pointed out by (William) James…Another name for satori is “kensho” (chien-hsing in Chinese) meaning “to see essence or nature,” which apparently proves that there is “seeing” or “perceiving” in satori…Without this noetic quality, satori will lose all its pungency, for it is really the reason of satori itself.” (Suzuki, Zen Buddhism: Selected Writings of D.T, Suzuki, 103-108.) 

Suzuki states that the noetic quality is “the reason of satori itself.” The satori experience operates outside of logic and discursive thought, and knowledge of this very fact is the only reasonable element of satori experience. In the moment of Satori, and in any attempts to express it linguistically, the ineffectiveness and limitations of language are seen clearly by the person experiencing these things. 

The [spiritual] relationship [between Zen and the Japanese conception of art] rises from an appreciation of the significance of life—of we may say the mysteries of life enter deeply into the compositions of art. When an art, therefore, presents those mysteries in a most profound and creative manner, it moves us to the depths of our being; art then becomes a divine work. The greatest productions of art, whether painting, music, sculpture, or poetry, have invariably this quality—something approaching the work of God.  The artist, at the moment when his creativeness is at its height, is transformed into an agent of the creator. This supreme moment in the life of an artist, when expressed in Zen terms, is the experience of Unconscious (mushin, no mind), psychologically speaking. Art has always something of the Unconscious about it. (Suzuki, Zen and Japanese Culture, p.219-220, emphasis mine.)

In the moment of Satori, the artist is transformed into an agent of the creator, experiencing their unconscious and imitating nature and creation. The experience of Satori seems to solve the problem of the artist within Zen. Satori is a passing experience, it is a sort of temporary enlightenment which allows the artist to take part in the process of time and creation. The ego does not factor into this experience. According to Suzuki, “sense of the beyond” is one of the characteristic traits of satori experience. It consists of a “loosening” of one’s sense of individuality, “a melting away into something indescribable, the feeling that one has finally arrived at a destination… In satori,” Suzuki writes, “there is always what we may call a sense of the Beyond; the experience indeed is my own but I feel it to be rooted elsewhere. The individual shell in which my personality is so solidly encased explodes at the moment of satori.” 

 

The Satori experience is bound inherently to the inability of language to express that experience. This is why, in Zen literature, the use of language is very deliberate and oftentimes nonsensical—Koans are a common form of written word used to express Zen; they are inaccessible to the discursive mind operating with Logic, and only may be understood through use of ones’ intuitive faculties. Haiku, oftentimes called “sublime poetry” is also historically bound to the Japanese written tradition. Haiku is restrained by its syllabic form, controlled to moderate the syllables and breath of the reader.

When used to convey the truths of Zen, language (and, as John Cage would have us amend, any other medium that Zen may take in the mind of the artist), is always used self-critically. The Zen artist or writer, having experienced Satori, is always aware of the limitations of their chosen medium. 

Zen follows a lineage of direct transmission from teacher to student, which according to legend originated with the Flower Sermon, in which The Buddha transmitted the True Dharma Eye to his disciple, Mahākāśyapa, the only one of his disciples who intuitively understood the meaning of the “sermon.” The Flower Sermon is Zen Buddhism. Before the legendary Flower Sermon, The Buddha offered regular ‘Dharma talks,’ where he would lecture to his disciples about a given topic related to Buddhism. 

According to the legend of the Flower Sermon, one day The Buddha gathered his disciples for the Dharma Talk, and without a word, he lifted his hand, which held a lotus blossom. His eyes twinkled and he smiled. At that moment, one of the disciples (Mahākāśyapa) smiled, signifying to the Buddha his direct cognition of the sermon. The Buddha said, “I possess the true Dharma eye, the marvelous mind of Nirvana, the true form of the formless, the subtle Dharma Gate that does not rest on words or letters but is a special transmission outside of the scriptures. This I entrust to Mahākāśyapa.”  Thus began the tradition in Zen Buddhism of the close relationship between teacher and student, and the practice of Transmission from the former to the latter, which is still practiced today. 

 

In response to having received the Kyoto Prize in November 1989, John Cage delivered a commemorative lecture for the Inamori Foundation, called simply, “An Autobiographical Statement.” In it, Cage addresses his artistic and intellectual influences, and provides a summary of his artistic ventures as they had progressed and evolved over time. Cage first became aware of Zen Buddhism while he was young, and studying at The Cornish School. He writes that later in life, Zen came to replace psychoanalysis for him. Cage regards his creative pursuits in a way that is reminiscent of Zen:

In my late thirties I heard a lecture by Nancy Wilson on Dada and Zen. I mention this in my forward to Silence then adding that I did not want my work blamed on Zen, though I felt that Zen changes in different times and places and what it has become here and now, I am not certain. Whatever it is it gives me delight and most recently by means of Stephen Addiss’ book The Art of Zen.  I had the good fortune to attend Daisetz Suzuki’s classes in the philosophy of Zen Buddhism at Columbia University in the late forties. And I visited him twice in Japan. I have never practiced sitting cross-legged nor do I meditate. My work is what I do and always involves writing materials, chairs, and tables. Before I get to it, I do some exercises for my back and I water the plants, of which I have around two hundred. (Cage, From Where’m’Now, in Statement”  p . 4)

 

When Cage writes, “I have never practiced sitting cross-legged nor do I meditate. My work is what I do”  it is clear that his “work” serves a meditative purpose in his life. He has created a ritual around that which comes naturally to him. If Zen is about embracing the mind and following one’s intuition, then Cage seems to be doing both of these things. There is no sense of desire in him to practice in any other way. Cage does not willingly identify himself as “being Zen,” but he does feel that Zen changes in different times and places. 

In his forward to Silence, John Cage asks, “What nowadays, America mid-twentieth century, is Zen?” (xi) He does not eliminate the possibility that his own practice may be in line with Zen Buddhism though they may be different—and he never apologizes for its difference. He says he “is not certain” what Zen has become here and now, but that he finds delight in Zen regardless. Cage’s early encounters with Zen Buddhism were accompanied by a sense of frustration in his inability to convey a certain emotion to his audience. This ultimately lead him to the belief that the purpose of music is to “imitate nature in her manner of operation”:

I was disturbed in my public life and my private life as a composer. I could not accept the academic idea that the purpose of music was communication, because I noticed that when I conscientiously wrote something sad, people and critics were often apt to laugh. I determined to give up composition unless I could find a better reason for doing it than communication. I found this answer from Gira Sarabhai, an Indian singer and tabla player: The purpose of music is to sober and quiet the mind, thus making it susceptible to divine influences. I also found in the writings of Ananda K. Coomaraswammy that the responsibility of the artist is to imitate nature in her manner of operation. I became less disturbed and went back to work. (Cage, “Statement” p. 3, emphasis mine)

Cage discovered in an anechoic chamber, that there is no such thing as silence, and that life is constant noise. The body unconsciously creates two sounds, a high tone created by the nerve’s systematic operation, and a lower tone created by the blood’s circulation throughout the body. John Cage promptly decided to devote his music to silence. His understanding of life and sound are intrinsically linked. For Cage, sound is life—both literally and figuratively. 

Following this idea, Cage asserts quite explicitly: “Until I die there will be sounds. And they will continue following my death. One need not fear about the future of music.” (Silence, 8) However, Cage states that: 

fearlessness is only possible if one turns in the the direction of those [sounds or silences] he does not intend. This turning is psychological and seems at first to be a giving up of everything that belongs to humanity—for a musician, the giving up of music. This psychological turning leads to the world of nature, where, gradually or suddenly, one sees that humanity and nature, not separate, are in this world together; that nothing was lost when everything was given away. In fact, everything is gained. In musical terms, any sounds may occur in any combination and in any continuity.” (Silence, p. 8)

The rhetoric used to convey Cage’s “turning toward silence” is reminiscent of Zen enlightenment narratives: He discusses sound and silence as Buddhists speak of existence, nonexistence and emptiness. He realizes the nature of emptiness in a sonic sense and then experiences the joyous realization of unlimited possibility that exists in every moment.    

In his essay on Experimental Music, Cage states that humans are, in fact, “technically equipped to transform our contemporary awareness of nature’s manner of operation into art.” (Silence, p. 9) But there is a parting of ways; one must choose: 

If he does not wish to give up his attempts to control sound, he may complicate his musical techniques towards an approximation of the new possibilities and awareness. (I use the word “approximation” because a measuring mind can never finally measure nature.) Or, as before, one may give up the desire to control sound, clear his mind of music, and set about discovering means to let sounds be themselves rather than vehicles for man-made theories or expressions of human sentiments.” (Silence, 10) 

 

Cage seems to be calling into question whether the idea of an artist is problematic within Zen. He desires to approximate nature in his musical works. Yet to do so requires that he control sound, thus going against nature. Cage has controlled sound in such a way that they might serve as vehicles for his man-made theories (consider 4’33’’). If his intuition urges him to create music and control sound, is that necessarily problematic?

John Cage’s goal as an artist seems to be to create the musical equivalent of a kōan, or a meditation, for his audience. Many of his works engage with the same ideas as Zen, such as chance, randomness, nonsense. Cage was a major proponent of Indeterminate Music, which incorporates an element of chance into the compositional process. In a letter to Pierre Boulez, he wrote, “chance comes in here to give us the unknown.” Cage’s work frequently incorporates this idea of chance/indeterminacy, releasing a controlled element of “the unknown” within a larger structure or constraint. Over time, Cage developed complicated mathematical processes using the I Ching to introduce these elements of chaos, indeterminacy. The use of time in his pieces is sometimes the random variable; other times, in the case of 4’33’’,  it was the audience in the room. 

In reading John Cage’s Autobiographical Statement, a pattern begins to emerge from his body of work: He begins his compositional process by developing a theoretical concept or problem (which oftentimes draws from Zen,) and then he plans his method of composition. Usually his method involves a set of self-imposed boundaries, and an element of chance.  Cage frequently created pieces such that the structure of the artwork or performance allowed for the incorporation of external, uncontrolled environmental events. This is his philosophy of Indeterminacy. Cage uses what he calls “experimental actions” as the pursuit and engagement with the unforeseen in his work. He wrote, “an experimental action is one the outcome of which is not foreseen” (Cage 1961, 39). Of Experimental Music, Cage wrote: 

In this new music nothing takes place but sounds: those that are notated and those that are not. Those that are not notated appear in the written music as silences, opening the doors of the music to the sounds that happen to be in that environment…There is no such thing as an empty space or an empty time. There is always something to see, something to hear. In fact, try as we may to make a silence, we cannot. (Silence, p. 7-8)

 

This creative structuring which involves an element of the unknown resembles za-zen. There are certain limitations one must abide by in practicing Zen meditation, such as the proper stance. (Sitting either cross-legged or on the edge of ones’ chair, with the spine in an erect posture.) One is told to focus on their breath, and to cast away any thoughts that enter their head. These thoughts resemble the element of chance that Cage consistently employed within his work. 

In the late forties I found out by experiment (I went into the anechoic chamber at Harvard University) that silence is not acoustic. It is a change of mind, a turning around. I devoted my music to it. My work became an exploration of non-intention. To carry it out faithfully I have developed a complicated composing means using I Ching chance operations, making my responsibility that of asking questions instead of making choices. (Statement, p. 4)

 

Cage’s use of chance and indeterminacy may be viewed as an attempt to “remove [him]self from the activities of the sounds [he] makes” (Cage, Silence. p. 10) something Cage desired to do on some level. Of 4’33’’, he wrote: “I wanted my work to be free of likes and dislikes, because I think music should be free of the feelings and ideas of the composer.” (Gann, No Such Thing As Silence, 16) Thus, Cage relinquished his artistic responsibility of “making choices” to chance, as an “exploration of non-intention.” However, the strictness of the mathematical processes used in the execution of chance in his music almost manage to eliminate the sense of spontaneity that is characteristic of Zen.  

Cage regards his writing and his creativity much in the same way as a Zen Buddhist regards za-zen; as a process rather than an object: “I don’t hear the music I write. I write in order to hear the music I haven’t yet heard.” (Cage, “Statement,” p. 8) As he matured, Cage developed a fascination with the relationship between performer and audience—how is it similar to the teacher/pupil relationship of Zen? His goal as an artist seems to be to manipulate these relationships in order to create a sort of meditation in his audience, to transport the listener to the current moment:

People paying attention to vibratory activity, not in reaction to a fixed ideal performance, but each time attentively to how it happens to be at this time, not necessarily two times the same. A music that transports the listener to the moment where he is. (Cage, “An Autobiographical Statement” p. 8). 

John Cage expected his audience members to listen to their environment much in the same way as somebody practicing Zen meditation would be aware of their surroundings. This, of course, was not communicated to the audience, which was clear in their response to 4’33’’.  The “boundaries” Cage established, and the element of chance present in 4’33’’ were determined by the space where it was first performed: in a concert setting, at a particular point in time, 

where any muttering or clearing one’s throat, let alone heckling, was a breach of decorum. Thus, there was already in place in these settings, as in other settings for Western art music, a culturally specific mandate to be silent, a mandate regulating the behavior that precedes and accompanies musical performance…

 

…4’33’’, by tacitly instructing the performer to remain quiet in all respects, muted the site of centralized and privileged utterance, disrupted the unspoken audience code to remain unspoken, transposed the performance onto the audience members. (Douglas Kahn in No Such Thing As Silence, p. 18-19)

4’33’’ casts a shadow of doubt on the simplicity of the models used to determine indeterminacy.  David Tudor (the pianist who performed 4’33’’ at its premiere) was made fully aware of the content of the music and his directions. All aspects of the composition were determined ahead of time, though the individuals who comprised the audience added an element of chance to the performance. However, 4’33’’ complicated the dynamic between performer and audience members by forcing the audience to become performers, in effect switching the rolls of performer and audience member.

In his book, No Such Thing as Silence: John Cage’s 4’3’’, Kyle Gann pointed out that the public reception of 4’33’’ is inseparable from the piece’s sonic identity: 

One of the crucial aspects of 4’33’’ at least in the first performances, is that there was a pianist onstage, whose presence, and whose behavior in the previous pieces on the program, clearly led the audience to expect that his hands would at some point engage the keyboard, and that they would hear deliberately made sounds coming from the stage. That this did not happen, that the listeners’ expectations were deliberately flouted, cannot be entirely divorced from the sonic identity of the piece. (Gann, No Such Thing as Silence, 17)

In a sense, Cage’s presentation of 4’33’’, and its public reception, echoed the legend upon which Zen Buddhism is built: The Flower Sermon, in which The Buddha conveyed the ineffable tathata (Sanskrit: thusness, suchness) to his disciple Mahākāśyapa, which could be understood as “the Truth” of Zen. Sandwiched between two “normally-played” pieces as it was, when 4’33’’ began, the audience had developed certain expectations of the pianist onstage, David Tudor, who sat poised before the piano. Similar expectations were present in all of The Buddha’s disciples except for Mahākāśyapa. When the Buddha, who had delivered many Dharma Talks before the Flower Sutra in a normal manner, held up the lotus without a word, his audience was confused, and even angry that their expectations from the previous Talks were not being met. Just as members of Cage’s audience stormed out of the concert hall, Buddha’s group of disciples did not intuitively understand the beauty of the present moment that The Buddha conveyed to Mahākāśyapa, without a single sound.  

 

 

 

BIBLIOGRAPHY

 

 

  • Cage, John. Silence: Lectures and Writings. Middletown, CT: Wesleyan UP, 1961. Print.
  • Cage, John. “An Autobiographical Statement.” Southwest Review (1991). Print.
  • Gann, Kyle. No Such Thing as Silence: John Cage’s 4’33” New Haven: Yale UP, 2010. Print.
  • James, William, Jaroslav Pelikan, and Bruce Kuklick. “Lectures XVI and XVII: Mysticism.” The Varieties of Religious Experience. New York: Library of America, 2010. 242-386. Print.
  • Matsuo, Bashō. The Narrow Road to the Deep North, and Other Travel Sketches;. Harmondsworth: Penguin, 1966. Print.
  • Plasencia, Clara, and Jorquera Ana. Jiménez. The Anarchy of Silence: John Cage and Experimental Art. Barcelona: Museu D’Art Contemporani De Barcelona, MACBA, 2009. Print.
  • Suzuki, D.T. Zen Buddhism: Selected Writings of D.T, Suzuki, (New York: Anchor Books, 1956), pp. 103-108.

  • Suzuki, Daisetz Teitaro, and Richard M. Jaffe. Zen and Japanese Culture. Princeton, NJ: Princeton UP, 2010. Print.

November 7, 2010
Notes on Today. Notes on Romance and Victoria.

I felt it again with Victoria—

Coleridge, Dorothy and Wordsworth the informers of a SAD generation

Of no hope; so tired of hearing about their GENeration. The etymology aRose

from its parents, motherfuckers—

…But I’m not fucking ___Allen Ginsberg__ and this is not Howl. I can’t even remember the author; when I wrote this with just a line—

to fill later… Oh Allen Ginsberg (you’re down there, sure, but do we love you—?)

So I can’t just write 3 names as I have on line 2. And what kind of way is I felt it again to begin a poem. 

To be reminded so many times of my absesses, 

The question of and meditations on HUMAN NATURE! by EEEVERYbody—

I know it’s lost, I know this isn’t a poem, and it’s definitely not a statement. 

7:47pm  |   URL: http://tmblr.co/ZLGbVy1Q4tdE
Filed under: writings Mabel journal 
May 25, 2010
Liberalism As Racism: Missteps in the Discourse on Race

 

The purpose of Newspeak was not only to provide a medium of expression for the world-view and mental habits proper to the devotees of Ingsoc, but to make all other modes of thought impossible. (George Orwell, 1984)

 

Even in the context of the dystopian 1984, George Orwell’s message that the limits of our language are the limits of our thought is strikingly relevant to the contemporary discourse on race. The degree to which language informs consciousness sheds light on the danger presented by the idea of “white privilege” which has found a significant presence within contemporary academic dialogue on race. My interest and investment in the removal of what I will call the “White Privilege Dynamic” is based in my own experience, which has revealed to me the essentially racist sentiment of the idea of “white privilege” as it is used by a certain group of “progressive” and self-described “white anti-racists.”

During the summer of 2009 I traveled to New Orleans with a youth-run organization that brings New York City high school students to New Orleans to rebuild and do work in community organizing. I knew little of the organization when I signed up, and was surprised to discover, upon arrival in New Orleans’ Lower Ninth Ward, that the trip consisted largely of an ideological element and canonical indoctrination. The first night I was there, the organizers (a handful of teenagers who would soon become my good friends) delivered a lecture on Katrina and its aftermath. They described the interactions between the (primarily “black”) inhabitants of the Lower Ninth Ward and the (primarily “white”) inhabitants of New Orleans’ neighboring wards. I knew very little about Louisiana politics and the racism that still exists. 

The lecture was heavily radicalized in that it aligned the conflict of the Lower Ninth Ward with a dichotomous understanding of race. It should be acknowledged that while the inhabitants of the Lower Ninth Ward are predominantly “black” (99% according to the 2000 U.S. Census; of Haitian, Creole, Caribbean, French, and African descent and surely more) and that the French Quarter is run mostly by people with light skin, cases do exist which betray these stereotypes. The humble number of these cases does not render them insignificant. These few cases are indispensable and were systematically disregarded by the leaders of the organization, lending to an incomplete depiction of the racial politics in New Orleans. 

That first lecture was also my introduction to the idea of “white privilege,” an idea central to the canon being established by the organization. I had never heard this term before, and knowing nothing of its meaning, was hugely annoyed by it—this annoyance has not faded. My peers and I were told by the organizers that we had experienced “white privilege.” We were told, with no knowledge of our individual backgrounds, that “white people” are given significant privilege over an elusive group of  “black people.” We were told that we were all racist, even if we hadn’t thought so. Several of us argued, but the organizers insisted that we were “scared of black people” and our arguments only suggested a lack of self-awareness. 

I began to see their understanding of race as indicative of a larger ideology and demographic. Those who use the term “white privilege” are, in my experience young, “white,” intellectual “activists” and “community-organizers.” They are very concerned with being “politically correct” and very militant about their political views. 

All “acknowledge” a sense of perceived “privilege” that they attribute to their light skin and which they call, mock-apologetically, their “white privilege.” In that sense, it is something they own and identify with: the idea that they embody and represent a sort of social dominance that is attached to the lightness of their skin. Their identification with the idea of “white privilege” is indicative of their collective identity (as I see it): as a segregationist sentiment consisting of two racial groups which are different and definitively unequal—disguised as progressivism and political correctness, and dictated by a self-perceivingly “privileged” white group of young, intellectual “anti-racists.”

The act of “acknowledging” one’s “privilege” is a central experience to and point of orientation for this demographic, seen as a preliminary action to the achievement of social change and actualized racial equality.  Though as an action, the “acknowledgment” of one’s observed “privilege” conceals intentions that are not virtuous nor conducive to the paragon cited by the aforementioned demographic.

I am fascinated by the social implications that surround the use of the term “white privilege” and the way that it works against the ideals central to the movement as a whole (a racially-equal society in which social interactions are not hindered by racial boundaries.) Being told that I have “white privilege” upon my arrival in New Orleans ultimately detracted from my experience. The organizers’ insistence on my inherent “privilege” created a boundary that had previously not restricted me and afterward required work to overcome. Until that point, I can honestly say that there was not an ounce of me that felt superior to people with darker skin than my own. And resist as I tried, there is only so much that somebody can ignore a message of superiority (as it has been forced on them) without allowing it to influence their behavior or consciousness in some way.

Thus, it is primarily from my own experience that I have come to be so passionate about the need to eliminate usage of the term “white privilege” and the message that it promotes. What social purpose is served by a term that emphasizes difference—rather, differences which are obsolete? The truth about race in America today is that it cannot accurately be discussed or viewed in dichotomous terms. “White” and “black” in their pure forms refer to a very small population within America. 

It would seem that rather than using terms that emphasize the difference between groups, those who seek social change (and abide so militantly by the standards of political correctness) would adopt terms that do not isolate such a significant portion of their audience. Why would this group of people, political as they claim to be, promote a term that isolates more than it unites?

I asked the organizers several times what it means to have “white privilege” and was repeatedly directed to read a piece by Peggy McIntosh, professor of Women’s Studies at Wellesley College, entitled “Unpacking the Invisible Knapsack.” This piece is definitive in the study of “white privilege” and referred to often by the demographic that I have previously described. Many have written about and elaborated on the process of “acknowledging” one’s “privilege,” notably McIntosh, who unforgettably compiled a list of the ways in which her intuited power is manifested in her everyday life. 

I have come to see white privilege as an invisible package of unearned assets that I can count on cashing in each day, but about which I was “meant” to remain oblivious. White privilege is like an invisible weightless knapsack of special provisions, maps, passports, codebooks, visas, clothes, tools and blank checks….I began to count the ways in which I enjoy unearned skin privilege and have been conditioned into oblivion about its existence….I decided to try to work on myself at least by identifying some of the daily effects of white privilege in my life. I have chosen those conditions that I think in my case attach somewhat more to skin-color privilege than to class, religion, ethnic status, or geographic location, though of course all these other acquaintances with whom I come into daily or frequent contact in this particular time, place and time of work cannot count on most of these conditions. (McIntosh, 189)

McIntosh’s conditions include:

1. I can if I wish arrange to be in the company of people of my race most of the time.

7. When I am told about our national heritage or about ‘civilization,’ I am shown that people of my color made it what it is.

9. If I want to, I can be pretty sure of finding a publisher for this piece on white privilege.

17. I can speak with my mouth full and not have people put this down to my color. 

30. If I declare there is a racial issue at hand, or there isn’t a racial issue at hand, my race will lend me more credibility for either position than a person of color will have.

33. I am not made acutely aware that my shape, bearing or body odor will be taken as a reflection on my entire race.

34. I can worry about racism without being seen as self-interested or self-seeking.

39. I can be late to a meeting without having the lateness reflect on my race. (McIntosh, 189)

Disregarding for a moment whether McIntosh’s racial paranoias have any basis in Reality, one might wonder what purpose this list serves within racial discourse as a whole. What implication does this list have on the individual reading it? On the collective consciousness of a demographic informed by early “whiteness theory”? Does this piece inspire the open-mindedness, humbleness and lack of prejudice required to achieve authentically positiveinterracial interaction? It does not seem so. 

In fact, it does the opposite. McIntosh does no more than make tangible her own racial paranoias and fear of otherness so that they might be adopted by others. McIntosh may call the adoption of these “revelations” progressive, but they are clearly detrimental to the human interactions which directly inform the larger discourse and collective consciousness of a population. After reading his piece, how is one able to interact with a person of a different race without projecting McIntosh’s fears—which are in no way universal—onto the other person? Will a “white person” ever be able to look at a “black person” outside of McIntosh’s lens of prejudice? (After all: Are all black people smelly, heavy and late?) McIntosh has inserted within the developing canon of “whiteness studies” reason after reason why humans cannot, or should not interact with those who appear differently than them.

To state the obvious, McIntosh’s piece relies incredibly on the pretense of a “white essence” which is inherently more “privileged” (better/stronger/more attractive/the list goes on) than those possessing a “black essence,” echoing the Enlightenment-era belief that, of two biologically discrete races, “white” is inherently superior. 

Perhaps McIntosh’s piece would have a more meaningful, productive resonance if it had emphasized the similarities and overlap she perceives between her own experience and the experience of a “different” race; or perhaps a list of her positive everyday interactions with otherness. 

And what effect does McIntosh’s piece have on those “black” (or “non-white”) people who may never have considered that their smell, appearance, or manner of eating be a reflection of their entire race? Certainly this piece does not provide a catalyst for meaningful conversation. Instead, it isolates and dehumanizes those people who do not identify with McIntosh’s ridiculous fears and observations—regardless of their race.

It should be noted that while McIntosh seems to be referring to “white people” in their entirety within America, the demographic that I am concerned with, is a small subset of the group McIntosh refers to. One should also consider that McIntosh’s views on race are derived from her position as a feminist who felt oppressed by men. Perhaps Unpacking the Invisible Knapsack is McIntosh trying desperately to “be aware” of the ways she has oppressed others, as she fantasized that men would do for her. But what good is “acknowledgment” of one’s “privilege” and “dominance” if not followed with sufficient reaction and an attempt to adjust?

The term “white privilege” carries heavy, negative social implications and is indicative of the mentality that many race theorists from the early ‘90s and to date have adopted. (It has even served as the stimulus from which was born an entire ludicrous academic field called “Whiteness Studies.”) These negative implications establish that the term “white privilege,” particularly in a progressive context, is meaningless, completely counter-productive, and in fact, an object of racism disguised as anti-racism. Barbara Kay, columnist for the National Post, wrote:

[Whiteness Studies] teaches that if you are white, you are branded, literally in the flesh, with evidence of a kind of original sin. You can try to mitigate your evilness, but you can’t eradicate it. The goal of Whiteness Studies is to entrench permanent race consciousness in everyone — eternal victimhood for nonwhites, eternal guilt for whites — and was most famously framed by WS chief guru, Noel Ignatiev, former professor at Harvard University [sic, Ignatiev was a Ph.D. student and then a tutor at Harvard, but never a professor], now teaching at the Massachusetts College of Art: ‘The key to solving the social problems of our age is to abolish the white race — in other words, to abolish the privileges of the white skin.’ 

Despite its politically-correct disguise, the term “white privilege” enforces and feeds in to the illusion of two “essential races” —white and black—which form a dichotomy, in which they are distinctly different and non-interacting. There is a group of race theorists called White Eliminativists who advance the position that the only way to respond to the issue of race is to eliminate the idea of whiteness directly as it is manifest in language and racial discourse. 

The White Eliminativist hopes to “expunge racial terms from our lexicons, laws and policies.” (Berger 148) It is from this position that I will argue that the term “white privilege” should be eliminated from racial dialogue. The Eliminativist positions often refers to scientific evidence that emphasizes interracial similarities in order to refute the Enlightenment-era belief in biologically distinct races. Science serves as an integral tool in illustrating that the concept of race has no genetic evidence. 

Let us consider for a moment the audience and perpetuators of this elusive “whiteness”  in America. What do these theorists say that it means to have “white privilege”? What is this “white identity” which has grabbed so much attention in the past 10 years? 

After claiming that President Obama has a “deep-seated hatred for white people, or the white culture,” Glenn Beck, conservative Fox News anchor and  had difficulty clarifying his thoughts: “What is white culture? I don’t know how to answer that that’s not a trap, you know what I mean?” (“Beyond the Pale” 69) Kelefa Sanneh, author of Beyond the Pale, suggested that the most appropriate answer to that question may be a joke, or a series of jokes.

The term “white privilege” is most prevalent within a small subset of what Beck calls “white culture”; it is the audience Christian Lander had in mind for “Stuff White People Like,” a list of what Lander perceives to be “white people’s” favorite things, but not all white people. 

His ‘white people’ are wealthy, urban, youngish, and thoroughly blue—they ‘hate’ Republicans, and although Obama hadn’t yet won the Democratic nomination, he placed eighth on the list….he sometimes defines ‘white people’ in opposition to ‘the wrong kind of white people,’ because his true target is a small subset of white people, a white cultural elite. (“Beyond the Pale” 69)

What is to be made of this cultural phenomena which injects self-deprecating humor into the “elite” cultural identity of “whiteness”? Is it productive to laugh about “white identity” because it is done in humor, or counterproductive because the topic still stands? The White Eliminativist would surely argue the latter, though one is left to wonder just how prevalent the distinction is between the elimination of the “white essence,” and the rejection of the established social group of which Lander writes. Biology has revealed the former as a myth, while evidence of the latter inarguably permeates Western culture.

Not surprisingly, the small subset that Lander describes refers to the same demographic that utilizes and embodies what I will call the White Privilege Dynamic.They are self-proclaimed activists and “community organizers,” the embodiments of Political Correctness. It is in the context of this demographical discourse that the term “White Privilege” has its root. The White Privilege Dynamic dictates wordlessly the way one approaches and speaks about the concept of “white privilege,” and by extension race in general, which is the essential problem.

In Playing in the Dark: Whiteness and the Literary Imagination, Toni Morrison seeks clarification about the invention and effect of what she calls “Africanism” in the United States. American Africanism, according to Morrison, is an investigation into a non-white, Africanlike (or Africanist) presence or persona that was constructed in the United States, and the imaginative uses that the fabricated presence serve. 

Morrison traces the roots of “Africanness” to the late 1600s as America was being established. She cites the construction of the African identity as the embodiment of an othering by the white majority, the result of misreadings, misteachings and assumptions by a Eurocentric people. 

The Africanist presence that developed from this “white” appropriation has been represented in literature ever since in such a way that has lead to the pervasion of several central characteristics of American literature—individualism, masculinity, the contrast between the representative ideas of lightness and darkness. The Africanist presence in American literature stands as a testament to the effect that living in a historically racialized society has had on American writings in the nineteenth and twentieth centuries. But not only do these qualities pervade literature and thought, they also contribute to the racial dynamic of an entire nation, centuries later. The emergence of Africanism (as a construct of American culture) was—and continues to be—strongly urged, thoroughly serviceable, companionably ego-reinforcing, and pervasive. (8)

Morrison argues that race has become a metaphor, a way of referring to forces, events, and forms of social decay, economic division and human panic. The idea of “white privilege” has come to operate in the same way.

As a disabling virus within literary discourse, Africanism has become, in the Eurocentric tradition that American education favors, both a way of talking about and a way of policing matters of class, sexual license, and reprehension, formations and exercises of power, and meditations on ethics and accountability. American Africanism makes it possible to say and not say, to inscribe and erase, to escape and engage, to act out and act on, to historicize and render timeless. It provides a way of contemplating chaos and civilization, desire and fear, and a mechanism for testing the problems and blessings of freedom. (7)

Morrison draws an interesting parallel between the othering and silencing of the American African identity and the “hysterical blindness” to femaleness throughout history. She notices that blatant sexist writings are on the decline and where they do still exist they have little effect because of what Morrison calls the “successful appropriation” by women of their own discourse. 

However it would seem that the methodical re-appropriation of sexist terms and concepts would be insufficient to alter the racial climate of an entire population. Movements of empowerment such as the feminist movement of the [early 1970s] have sought power in language. The feminist re-appropriation of “women” to “womyn” was an attempt to claim an identity independent of the powerful male identity. Replacing the suffix“-men” from the original word with gender-neutral “-myn” was intended to be representative of a shift in consciousness, of a claim of power and establishment of identity. Yet, it could be argued that this particular re-appropriation had little effect on its audience. 

The same idea has been used in the fight for racial equality. By eliminating the “Uncle Tom” connotations of the term “negro” in the 1960s and 1970s, “blacks” sought to alter more than a dictionary entry. The idea was that in altering language, one could alter the consciousness of an entire population. A strong effort has been made to eliminate usage of the N-word, although it has been re-appropriated in a different context, by (primarily non-white) youth as a colloquial expression of camaraderie, friendship, similarity. It is impossible to separate the reclaiming of the N-word from the controversy that surrounds it: after all, the word “nigger” is soaked in emotion in a way that “women” never has been. 

As in the debate over “whiteness,” there are advocates of countless perspectives that compose a wide range of views, from Total Eliminatavists to those dismissive of linguistic appropriation as a tool for social change. 

This tradition of renaming and reclaiming race is responsible for the idea of the “hyphenated identity.” In the 1980s the term “African-American” was constructed on the model of German-American and Irish-American in an attempt to give the descendants of slaves a definitive heritage and cultural base. The term was popularized colloquially by black audiences and then received mainstream acceptance after Reverend Jesse Jackson used the term before a national audience, granting it mainstream appeal in the early 1980s. (Out of the Mouths of Slaves, x)

Many self-identified black people expressed that they preferred the term as it was formed in the same manner as the titles of other ethnic groups in America. For many the term African-American is a platform for the uniting of all peoples having origin in any of the black racial groups of Africa, an embrace of pan-Africanism as it was described by W.E.B. Du Bois and Marcus Garvey. (The term has garnered some negative attention in that it has in many cases come to signify no more than a dark complexion, and has no basis in an identity that is actually derived from Africa.)

The Hyphenated Identity is significant in that it ideally forces its users to step out of the habitual racial dichotomy of “black” and “white.” The adoption of terms such as “African-American” has improved racial interaction by forcing us to recognize race for what it truly is—a distribution of color that is not only a simple combination of “black” and “white,” but encompassing infinite amalgamations of many colors.

It is in the context of the race complication that an academic discipline devoted to the study of “whiteness” has no significance nor social purpose. Whiteness Studies (the academic discipline) seems to be a perverse, empty mimicry of the black empowerment movement. Like the introduction of the term “African-American,” “African/Black Studies” (an academic department at many universities) had a social purpose: to empower an oppressed people through emphasis and celebration of a perceivably innate identity.

How, then, has Whiteness Studies emerged and developed into a legitimate academic discipline? Whiteness Studies claims to be “an attempt to think critically about how white skin preference has operated systematically, structurally, and sometimes unconsciously as a dominant force in America—and indeed in global—society and culture.” (Dr. Gregory Jay, Professor of English at the University of Wisconsin)

What is problematic is the critical thought being devoted to this perceived sense of dominance and privilege. What are the social implications of devotion to a topic so riddled with negative connotations and so historically oppressive and isolating? 

It seems that the one central characteristic of the “White Identity” that fascinates these academics is its elitism and isolation from other races. What social purpose does a discipline serve that consists almost wholly of “white” people, studying the ways in which “white” people have oppressed, neglected and systematically dominated people of all other races? What reactions does discourse on topics such as “white privilege” and an “inherent dominance” attached to light skin provoke in people who do not identify as being white? What are the psychosocial effects of this discourse on “white” people, “black” people, and people who cannot (or choose not to) call themselves either?

Political satirist Stephen Colbert has jokingly claimed to be racially “color-blind,” though his claim does have some cultural referent:  “Now, I don’t see race … People tell me I’m white, and I believe them, because I own a lot of Jimmy Buffett albums.” Colbert’s membership to the new “Malan Race” was recently confirmed. The “Malan Race” is surely a product of what some have called our “post-race” society, an attempt to renounce racial stereotypes, definitions and boundaries—to “wipe the [racial] slate clean and chose to start fresh.” 

Malans are “color-blind,” but all human, and are classified almost wholly by ideology. Though there is no doubt this was Colbert’s execution of a reducio ad absurdum parody—the idea that America is “post-race” has been gaining popularity ever since America’s election of president Barack Obama, which has forced America to begin to see race for the complicated, perhaps obsolete construct that it has become. 

The “Malan Race,” like the white eliminativist position, may be seen as an intermediate step toward the realization of the “progressive” racial ideal. The eradication of the term “white privilege”may not have immediate effects on the achievement of an authentically equal racial climate, however it is in the spirit of George Orwell that we might hope that they are both indicative of something much larger. In a way, the Malan Race, though seemingly absurd, signifies a shift in consciousness and acceptance of the generally convoluted state of race in America today. 

Ultimately what is necessary for the achievement of these declared ideals is an alteration of the consciousness that informs the way that we understand race. We should not seek to be color-blind, but to acknowledge one another as different and also cultivate an appreciation for a colorful, multicultural, and racially equal society that we might one day contribute to. 

 

BIBLIOGRAPHY

  • Baugh, John. Out of the Mouths of Slaves: African American Language and Educational Malpractice. Austin: University of Texas, 1999. Print.
  • Berger, Maurice. White Lies Race and the Myths of Whiteness. New York: Farrar, Straus, Giroux, 1999. Print.
  • Christie, Frederic. “Racial Color-Blindness: Just As Bad As Regular Blindness | Red Room.” Red Room. 10 Nov. 2008. Web. 25 May 2010.
  • Colbert, Stephen. “Color Blindness.” The Colbert Report. The Comedy Channel. Los Angeles, CA. Television.
  • Kay, Barbara. “Blaming Whitey.” National Post [Washington] 13 Sept. 2006. Print.
  • Lander, Christian. Stuff White People Like: the Definitive Guide to the Unique Taste of Millions. New York: Random House Trade Paperbacks, 2008. Print.
  • McIntosh, Peggy
  • Morrison, Toni. Playing in the Dark: Whiteness and the Literary Imagination. New York: Vintage, 1993. Print.
  • Orwell, George. 1984. San Diego: Harcourt Brace Jovanovich, 1984. Print.
  • Sanneh, Kelefa. “Beyond the Pale.” The New Yorker [New York City] 12 Apr. 2010: 69-74. Print.

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